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Book Reviews
HANDBOOK

OF ADMmIALTY

LAW IN

THE UNITED STATES.

By Gustavus H. Robinson. St. Paul. West Publishing Co.,
1939. Pp. 1025. $5.00.
In the desert of case-books which have appeared in increasing numbers in recent years, Professor Gustavus H.
Robinson's new text-book, called a "Handbook of Admiralty Law", appears as a refreshing oasis. Dealing with
a salt water subject, the book performs the miracle of making that water both potable and stimulating.
The present reviewer, who has for some years used
the case-book method of teaching the law of Admiralty in
his classes at the University of Maryland, is delighted by
the appearance of a competent text-book, long enough to
treat the divisions of the subject adequately, short enough
to be usable in the class room.
Although a well compiled and adequately noted casebook offers certain advantages in the method of teaching,
it has always seemed to this reviewer that it fails to complete its own job by rounding out the inductions which
the student is supposed to make in a concise and balanced
synthesis of the subject in hand. While the cases are, under our system, the ultimate authority, they are not the
source to which one should turn for a statement of the
elementary principles of any branch of the law. Every
practising attorney at law (and proctor in admiralty) has
had the experience of looking in vain through the reports
for a clear statement of a simple but fundamental principle.
Professor Robinson's new volume is published as part
of the Hornbook Series, in succession to Hughes on Admiralty, the standard for many years, the last edition of
which was published in 1921. But Robinson's book is a
far better book than Hughes' ever was. It is longer; it
is better arranged; it is more complete in every way. While
pretending to no dignity higher than that of an elementary textbook, it is in fact a full and up to date outline
of the whole substantive law of Admiralty. The text is
complete, and the notes are astonishingly full and varied,
ranging from citations of foreign cases, through adminis-
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trative decisions and legislative reports, to newspaper accounts of recent occurrences and policies.
Although Admiralty is one of the oldest branches of
the law, it has undergone great changes in the last few
years. These changes have been made by statute more
than by judicial interpretation, and Professor Robinson's
treatment has emphasized this aspect of maritime law
throughout the book. The Maritime Lien Acts of 1910
and 1920, Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,
the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, the Public Vessels Act,
1925, the Longshoremen's Compensation Act, 1927, the
Limitation of Liability Acts, 1935 and 1936, and the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, have changed many of the
fundamentals of the old admiralty almost beyond recognition. All of these changes are dealt with by Professor
Robinson in the light, not only of the reported decisions,
but also of the underlying and conflicting economic and
personal interests and public policies reflected in them.
The style of the author reflects his realistic and practical point of view. The book makes good reading, and
is enlivened by comments in non-academic phrase. For
example, in discussing the priority of maritime liens for
personal injury over those of supplymen, the reason for
preferring the tort lien is summed up in the untechnical
statement that
"the reaction (of the courts) is in favor of the poor
fellow who was hurt over the man who sold goods for
which he was not paid."
To the proctor practicing in Maryland, it is gratifying to note how much of the law has been made in this
District and in this Circuit. While we must acknowledge
the pre-eminence of New York both in amount and importance of litigation, the present volume indicates that
Maryland ranks high in the significant and important decisions of recent years.'
"Among those which have had important influence are Judge Rose's
opinions in Virginia, 266 Fed. 437 (D. Md. 1920); Atlantic Transport
Co. v. Imbrovek, 193 Fed. 1019 (D. Md. 1912), affirmed 234 U. S. 52,
34 S. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208 (1914); Yaye Maru, 265 Fed. 850 (D. Md.
1920), affirmed 274 Fed. 195 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921); and Acme Operating
Corp. v. U. S., 283 Fed. 449 (D. Md. 1922); Judge Soper's In Nivose,
1923 A. M. C. 947, 291 Fed. 412 (D. Md. 1923); Liberator, 1924 A. M. C.
684, 298 Fed. 159 (D. Md. 1924) ; and Eastern Shore, 1926 A. M. 0. 899,
15 Fed. (2d) 82 (D. Md. 1926) ; Judge Coleman's in William Leishear, 1927
A. M. C. 1770, 21 Fed. (2d) 862 (D. Md. 1927); Little Charley, 1929 A.
M. C. 298, 31 Fed. (2d) 120 (D. Md. 1929); Emilia S. de Perez, 1927 A.
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This reviewer looks forward to using Professor Robinson's book in his Admiralty class next year. He also recommends it to all who are interested in maritime law as
a clear, accurate and condensed statement of the subject.
There is no other book extant which offers or pretends to
offer so much to the student or to the practising proctor.
EMORY H. NILES.*

A

HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM

LEGISLATION IN

By Eldridge Foster Dowell.
more. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1939. Pp. 176.
THE UNITED STATES.

Balti-

This book dealing with the criminal syndicalism laws
passed by more than twenty western and mid-western
states during and immediately following the World War
strikes a particularly pertinent note at the present moment
when the world is teetering on the brink of another holocaust. In the United States, an argument to the effect
that we must remain neutral at all costs is that if we
should happen to be drawn in, even our ultimate victory
would not prevent our cherished democratic institutions
from falling by the wayside. Dr. Dowell's study of the
syndicalism laws gives us an interesting insight into one
example, at least, of repressive legislation which results
from the harsh judgments engendered by war. Here is
one instance of the philosophy of dictatorship, a philosophy
which would stifle every unpopular expression of opinion.
Here is, moreover, an instance of how such legislation
will outlive whatever occasion there might be for its existence and remain an instrument of repression in normal
times.
The book under review is the result of an intensive
piece of research undertaken by the author at the Johns
Hopkins University. The printed volume, however, is only
the condensed version of a work of some thirteen hundred pages of manuscript. It represents what was obviM. C. 1839, 22 Fed. (2d) 585 (D. Md. 1927) ; Danielsen v. Entre Rios Rys.
Co., 1927 A. M. C. 1800, 22 Fed. (2d) 326 (D. Md. 1927) ; Oakmar, 1937
A. M. C. 1135, 20 Fed. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1937); and Losmar, 1937 A. M.
C. 1295, 20 Fed. Supp. 887 (D. Md. 1937), and Judge Chesnut's in Calvin,
1935 A. M. C. 155, 9 Fed. Supp. 411 (D. Md. 1935) ; Emma Giles, 1936 A. M. C.
1146, 15 Fed. Supp. 502 (D. Md. 1936); Algic, 1937 A. M. C. 1611, 95
Fed. (2d) 784 (D. Md. 1937).
* Associate Judge, Supreme Bench, Baltimore City. Lecturer on Admiralty, University of Maryland School of Law.
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ously a thorough investigation of a subject about which
detailed information was not to be gleaned from books in
a library. As a matter of fact, much of the author's material came from a voluminous correspondence which he
carried on with many of the principals who had first hand
knowledge of the subject. These original sources are used
to great advantage. The fact, however, that he was obliged
to summarize his findings and to utilize footnotes to such
an extent has made the book less readable than it might
otherwise have been. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting picture which amply repays the reader for the time
spent in digesting the story it tells.
As Dr. Dowell points out in his preface, he is not primarily concerned with the administration of the criminal
syndicalism statutes nor with the interpretation given them
by the courts. His is a study of the forces involved in
the enacting, amending or repealing of such laws and the
attempts made in these directions.
The work is divided into four principal parts. Chapter
I devotes itself to a discussion of the organization against
which the syndicalism laws were chiefly directed, namely
the I. W. W., and deals with the theories and practices of
this group and the treatment it received in the press. It is
a story of the violence directed against a radical labor organization, due to a considerable extent to the misunderstanding created in the public mind by the vilifying campaign that the press conducted. This antagonistic "public opinion" was apparently fostered and molded by the
industrial interests which the I. W. W. opposed.
The results of this "red baiting" campaign are described
in Chapter II, which, incidentally, might well serve also
as a text on pressure politics. By various methods, criminal syndicalism bills were introduced and promoted in
the several legislatures, the members of which
"... were average middle class Americans .. . usually uncritical of what they read in the newspapers
and endowed with a deep antipathy or distrust for
groups or individuals labeled as radical or unpatriotic. Due to this situation, the existence of special
interests who desired a criminal syndicalism bill and
were represented in or before the legislature, and the
usual rush in which the legislature worked, the result
was usually a foregone conclusion. Either the bill
was passed with breath-taking swiftness and little debate, or with a great outburst of oratory character-
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ized more by passion, prejudice, and misinformation
than by a reasoned effort to get at the facts or a calm
consideration of the issues involved. Only a few
groups of individuals, such as labor representatives or
liberals and progressives, opposed, because of fear of
harm to the trade unions or of an infringement upon
freedom of speech, the press and assemblage, etc., the
popular clamor for such legislation. And after the
criminal syndicalism bill was enacted a close examination of its terms revealed that it went much further than outlawing or restricting radical groups, and
constituted a potential menace to the rights and activities of labor, to the civil liberties of the ordinary citizen, and to the free expression and circulation of
certain doctrines and thoughts."'
Chapter III deals with those instances in which efforts
to enact syndicalism laws were unsuccessful. The time
element was undoubtedly an important factor in these
cases, since they occurred mostly at a considerably later
date, namely between 1927 and 1933. Moreover, attention is directed to the fact that the press was not nearly
so favorable to these bills failing of enactment as in the
earlier period.
Chapter IV describes the attempts which have been
made to moderate or repeal the criminal syndicalism statutes. Three states are listed as having repealed their
laws, two of them in the legislative sessions of 1937. If
anything, the trend would seem to be towards repeal, although the present unsettled state of affairs in the world
will probably have an unfavorable reaction upon any such
movements.
From his study of the criminal syndicalism laws, the
author concludes that there is much danger to our free
institutions in this type of legislation. These particular
statutes, he emphasizes, go much further than to punish
the committing or advocating of acts of violence against
life, property or the government, since they make criminal
"the advocacy or suggestion of doctrines" of revolutionary
character. This significant distinction has been pointed out
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in the
Whitney case,2 as follows:
1P.

47.

Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372 ff., 71 L. Ed. 1095, 1104 ff.,
47 S. Ct. 641, 647 ff. (1929).

1939]

BOOK REVIEWS

"The felony which the statute created is a crime
very unlike the old felony of conspiracy or the old
misdemeanor of unlawful assembly. The mere act
of assisting in forming a society for teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of it, or of assembling
with others for that purpose is given the dynamic
quality of crime. There is guilt although the society
may not contemplate immediate promulgation of the
doctrine. Thus the accused is to be punished, not for
attempt, incitement or conspiracy, but for a step in
preparation, which, if it threatens the public order
at all, does so only remotely. The novelty in the prohibition introduced is that the statute aims, not at
the practice of criminal syndicalism, not even directly
at the preaching of it, but at association with those
who propose to preach it ....
Even advocacy of violation [of law], however reprehensible morally, is not
a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately
acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and
incitement, between preparation and attempt, between
assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind." 8
The reading of this book invites at least one comment.
In the American constitutional system, courts of law are
reluctant to invalidate a law unless it violates an express
or implied principle of a constitution. The negation of
a statute merely because it is perhaps repugnant to the
"spirit" of a constitution is usually frowned upon as an
improper exercise of the power of judicial review. But
legislation violative of the "spirit" of a constitution obviously approaches the periphery of legislative discretion.
Since it is judicially "constitutional", legislation within this
twilight zone finds its limitation only in the legislature's
own sense of self-restraint. Dr. Dowell's study makes it
I Professor Chafee has said regarding the question: "These statutes
are not directed against those who commit or actually plan violence, but
against those who express or even hold opinions which are distasteful
to the substantial majority of citizens. . . . These acts have been drafted
by men who are so anxious to avoid any disturbance of law and order
that they have punished by long prison terms and heavy fines not only
provocation to the use of force, but also the promulgation of any ideas
which might possibly, if accepted, cause someone to use force. . . . The
difference between the expression of radical views and direct provocation
to revolution is only a difference of degree, but it is a difference which
the normal criminal law regards as all-important." Freedom of Speech
(1920) 174-175, quoted in Dowell, 145.
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evident that our criminal syndicalism laws in most instances represent an utter disregard by state law-making
bodies of this responsibility.
Except possibly during periods of actual emergency,
the best course, and the one most faithful to our fundamental concepts as a free nation, would appear to be that
expressed over a century ago by Thomas Jefferson:
"If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety
with which error of opinion may be tolerated where
reason is left to combat it."4
NELSON B. LASSON.*
1 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1897) 310.
Formerly Lecturer in Political Science, College
of Arts and Sciences, University of Maryland.
* Of the Baltimore Bar.

